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“Secret Combinations”:
A Legal Analysis
Nathan Oman

S

ince the publication of the Book of Mormon in 1830, those subscribing to an environmental explanation have sometimes argued that its
account of Gadianton robbers and secret combinations is a thinly veiled
attack on Masonry, reﬂecting the burst of anti-Masonic feeling in New
York in the last half of the 1820s. Alexander Campbell seems to have
been the ﬁrst one to advance the anti-Masonic thesis, writing in February 1831.¹ However, Campbell soon rejected his original explanation in
favor of the Spalding theory, which rapidly became the dominant nonMormon explanation for the Book of Mormon in that century.² The antiMasonic thesis, however, was revived and deepened in the opening decades of the twentieth century.³ By the time of her famous 1945 biography
of Joseph Smith, Fawn Brodie was conﬁdently asserting that the Book of
Mormon’s discussion of secret combinations “were bald parallels of Masonic oaths.”⁴ Since the publication of No Man Knows My History, the
1. See Richard L. Bushman, Joseph Smith and the Beginnings of Mormonism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 125.
2. See ibid., 231 n. 37 (which states that Campbell accepted the “Spalding-Rigdon
hypothesis” later in life) and ibid., 127 (which states that the Spalding theory was the
dominant non–Latter-day Saint explanation of the Book of Mormon in the nineteenth
century). For a summary of the Spalding theory, see Lester E. Bush Jr., “The Spalding
Theory Then and Now,” Dialogue 10/4 (1977): 40.
3. See Walter F. Prince, “Psychological Tests for the Authorship of the Book of Mormon,” American Journal of Psychology 28 (July 1917): 373–89.
4. Fawn M. Brodie, No Man Knows My History (New York: Knopf, 1945), 65.
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anti-Masonic thesis has become common among non–Latter-day Saint
writers on Mormonism.⁵ In recent years, Dan Vogel has been its most
articulate proponent.⁶
Scholars have disputed the thesis. Richard Bushman, Blake Ostler,
Daniel Peterson, and D. Michael Quinn have been its main critics.⁷
The basic thrust of their arguments is that the claimed parallels between
Masonry and the Gadianton robbers are superﬁcial. Peterson, for example, notes that some proponents of the thesis have argued that the
fact that both Masons and Gadianton robbers wore lambskin aprons
is signiﬁcant (see 3 Nephi 4:7).⁸ However, he argues that this parallel
is trivial since there is but a single reference to “lambskins” as Gadianton garb, which has no particular signiﬁcance in the narrative,
and the Book of Mormon lists other clothing worn by the robbers.⁹
5. See, for example, Thomas F. O’Dea, The Mormons (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 23, 35, 57; Robert N. Hullinger, Mormon Answer to Skepticism: Why
Joseph Smith Wrote the Book of Mormon (St. Louis: Clayton, 1980), 100–104; David Persuitte, Joseph Smith and the Origins of the Book of Mormon (Jeﬀerson, NC: McFarland,
1985), 174–80.
6. See Dan Vogel, “Mormonism’s ‘Anti-Masonick Bible,’ ” John Whitmer Historical
Association Journal 9 (1989): 17–30; Dan Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry: A Rejoinder
to the Critics of the Anti-Masonic Thesis,” in American Apocrypha, ed. Dan Vogel and
Brent Lee Metcalfe (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 2002), 275–320.
7. Bushman, Joseph Smith and the Beginnings of Mormonism, 128–31; Blake Ostler,
“The Book of Mormon as a Modern Expansion of an Ancient Source,” Dialogue 20/1
(1987): 66, 73–76; Daniel C. Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” in Warfare in the
Book of Mormon, ed. Stephen D. Ricks and William J. Hamblin (Salt Lake City: Deseret
Book and FARMS, 1990), 181; D. Michael Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World
View, 2nd ed. (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1997), 202 and 511–12 n. 216. All citations
in this paper are to this revised edition of Quinn’s book. Quinn takes the anomalous
position that secret combinations in the Book of Mormon refer to black magic and occult
murders, or at any rate that they were understood this way by the book’s ﬁrst readers.
Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World View, 207. However, Quinn’s thesis does
not seem to have caught on even with environmental critics eager to locate the Book of
Mormon entirely in a nineteenth-century context. See, for example, Vogel, “Echoes of
Anti-Masonry,” 276. For a recent discussion, see Paul Mouritsen, “Secret Combinations
and Flaxen Cords: Anti-Masonic Rhetoric and the Book of Mormon,” Journal of Book of
Mormon Studies 12/1 (2003): 64–77.
8. Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 180.
9. Ibid., 203. Matthew B. Brown, “Girded About with a Lambskin,” Journal of Book
of Mormon Studies 6/2 (1997): 124–51, provides a much lengthier treatment of the issue.
Brown argues that the lambskin passages are more important to the narrative than Peter-
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The critics of the anti-Masonic thesis also point out that the Book of
Mormon’s secret combinations exhibit features absent from antiMasonic rhetoric.¹⁰ For example, Blake Ostler has argued that “the
Book of Mormon secret societies diﬀer from Masons in the precise
ways they are similar to ancient Near Eastern bands of robbers.”¹¹ In
addition, critics of the thesis argue that certain key features of antiMasonic rhetoric are absent from the Book of Mormon’s discussions
of Gadianton robbers. For example, Quinn argues that a stock element
of the anti-Masonic furor of the 1820s was a denial that Masonry had
any ancient origins.¹² In contrast, even the opponents of secret combinations within the Book of Mormon narrative acknowledge their
ancient roots (see 2 Nephi 26:22; Alma 37:21–30; 3 Nephi 3:9).
The argument over the anti-Masonic thesis is multifaceted, involving as it does attempts to ﬁnd or refute parallels between two complex
phenomena. In his most recent work on the subject, Vogel claims to
“respond to all of the major and most, if not all, of the minor arguments against the anti-Masonic thesis.”¹³ He then goes on to discuss
no less than seventeen speciﬁc subdisputes.¹⁴ A comprehensive discussion of the debate is beyond the scope of this paper. I will not survey the full range of arguments oﬀered for or against the anti-Masonic
thesis, nor will I attempt to lay the issue to rest.¹⁵ Instead, I will focus
on one possible line of analysis of a single issue within the debate.
son claims. However, Brown also holds that rather than being a Masonic reference, the
lambskins in the Book of Mormon may have connections with ritual clothing that was
worn in ancient Israel, Egypt, and Mesoamerica.
10. See, for example, Ostler, “Book of Mormon as a Modern Expansion,” 73–76.
11. Ibid., 74. While Ostler rejects a crude version of the anti-Masonic thesis and regards the Book of Mormon as at least in part an authentic ancient text, he believes that
anti-Masonic rhetoric had some inﬂuence on the Book of Mormon. He writes: “[Certain
passages about secret combinations] appear to be inﬂuenced by anti-Masonic terminology and concerns. They may be explained best, it seems to me, as Joseph Smith’s independent commentary on Masonry, sparked by his reﬂection on Nephite secret combinations.” Ibid., 76.
12. Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World View, 203.
13. Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 277.
14. See ibid., 277–305.
15. Participants on both sides have claimed that the debate has been decisively settled. Compare William J. Hamblin, “An Apologist for the Critics: Brent Lee Metcalfe’s
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One claim made by the proponents of the anti-Masonic thesis is
that during the late 1820s the term secret combination had a unique
and nearly exclusive association with Masonry. Vogel claims that “after
extensive reading in the primary pre-1830 sources” he was “unable to
ﬁnd another use for the term and doubted that one would be found.”¹⁶
It is, of course, undisputed that the term secret combination was used
in the late 1820s to refer to Masonry.¹⁷ What critics of the anti-Masonic
thesis question is whether or not it had an exclusively Masonic meaning.¹⁸ I hope to throw light on this question by examining the use of
the phrase secret combination in legal materials both from before the
publication of the Book of Mormon and from the subsequent period
of Joseph Smith’s lifetime. This approach has been taken and criticized
before.¹⁹ However, I hope to show that previous attempts to use legal
materials have been incomplete and in some ways mistaken. I also
seek to respond to the claim that such legal materials are irrelevant to
the anti-Masonic thesis. I conclude that the phrase secret combination
did not have an exclusively anti-Masonic meaning either before or after the publication of the Book of Mormon and that, on the contrary,
it was a term used to discuss hidden, criminal conspiracies.
Assumptions and Methodologies,” Review of Books on the Book of Mormon 6/1 (1994):
499–500 (which states that Daniel Peterson’s work had deﬁnitively laid the anti-Masonic
thesis to rest) with Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 275 (which states that the truth of
the anti-Masonic thesis has “long [been] regarded as obvious”). I will take the fact that
ink continues to be spilled after more than 170 years as evidence that the question remains open to fruitful discussion.
16. Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 318 n. 75. Compare with Peterson, “‘Secret Combinations’ Revisited,” Journal of Book of Mormon Studies 1 (1992): 184, 185 n. 5. Peterson writes,
“On 26 August 1989, Vogel and his sometime coauthor Brent Metcalfe, in a Salt Lake City
conversation with me and my colleague, Prof. Stephen D. Ricks, declared ﬂatly that the phrase
‘secret combination’ was never used at the time of the translation and publication of the Book
of Mormon, except to refer to Freemasonry.” Ibid., 185 n. 5.
17. Dan Vogel, as quoted in Peterson, “ ‘Secret Combinations’ Revisited,” 184.
18. See Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 189–97; Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World View, 511–12 n. 216.
19. See Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’” 191–93; and Vogel, “Echoes of AntiMasonry,” 300–301.
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Background
In 1826, Captain William Morgan, a resident of Canandaigua, a
town a short distance from Palmyra, New York, prepared to publish
an exposé of secret Masonic rituals after quarreling with members of
his Masonic lodge.²⁰ However, he never printed his tell-all account.
In September of that year, he disappeared near Niagara, and it was
almost universally believed that he had been murdered by vengeful
Masons. When those indicted for the murder were either acquitted or
received light sentences, there was a wave of anti-Masonic agitation in
response. New York State saw repeated conventions, mass meetings,
and newspaper articles denouncing Masonry as a threat to the Republic and a criminal fraternity bent on protecting its own. In particular,
people were outraged at the perceived inﬁltration and perversion of
the legal system by Masons in the Morgan case.²¹ The epicenter of all
this activity was just a few miles from Joseph Smith’s home in Palmyra.
Anti-Masonry even became, for a short time, a national political issue
in the late 1820s and early 1830s.²² Anti-Masons repeatedly referred to
Masonry as a “secret combination.”²³ Proponents of the anti-Masonic
thesis have pointed to this phrase as one piece of evidence supporting
their argument, claiming that the term was so closely tied with Masonry as to constitute an intentional reference.²⁴
In order to eﬀectively criticize the claim that the phrase secret
combination refers exclusively to Masonry, Quinn has argued that
“it is necessary to ﬁnd someone (preferably a non-Mason) using the
phrase ‘secret combination’ in a non-Masonic context before the
. . . murder of William Morgan in 1826.”²⁵ Peterson has found one
1826 reference to “secret combination” that is arguably outside of the
20. See Allen E. Roberts, Freemasonry in American History (Richmond, VA: Macoy
and Masonic Supply, 1985), 228–29.
21. Vogel, “Mormonism’s ‘Anti-Masonick Bible,’ ” 21.
22. Ibid., 19–21.
23. See, for example, ibid., 22.
24. Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 300.
25. Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World View, 511 n. 216.
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context of anti-Masonry.²⁶ On 15 December 1826, Andrew Jackson
wrote a letter to Sam Houston, attacking his long-time political opponent Henry Clay.²⁷ In it, he accused Clay of “secrete [sic] combinations of base slander” to smear Jackson’s wife in the press.²⁸ Peterson
has pointed to this letter as an instance of a non-Masonic context in
which the phrase secret combination was used.²⁹ Quinn has criticized
this conclusion.³⁰ According to Quinn, Jackson was an active Mason
attacking Clay, a lapsed Mason.³¹ He thus speculates that Jackson
may have been using the phrase secret combination as a sarcastic dig
at Clay.³² Although there is no direct evidence that Jackson meant
the term to convey any Masonic subtext, Vogel refers to Quinn’s
argument appreciatively.³³ He also states that “regardless, the term
‘secret combination’ did not take on its full anti-Masonic meaning
until 1827–28.”³⁴ This is a strangely inconsistent addition to Quinn’s
analysis since Vogel seems, in eﬀect, to argue that Jackson’s comment was an ironic play on a common political phrase that would
not become a common political phrase for another two years.
Looking at Legal Materials
Peterson has also looked at legal materials. In 1990, John W.
Welch, a professor at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law
School, conducted a computerized search of nineteenth-century legal
materials for Peterson.³⁵ In his piece, Peterson noted the limitations of
his research: “Unfortunately, . . . many states did not begin printing
reports with any degree of comprehensiveness until midway through
26. Peterson, “ ‘Secret Combinations’ Revisited,” 186–87.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 187.
29. Ibid.
30. Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World View, 511–12 n. 216.
31. Ibid. But Peterson noted the connections of Jackson and Clay to Masonry in his
article. See Peterson, “ ‘Secret Combinations’ Revisited,” 187 and 187 n. 11.
32. Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World View, 512 n. 216.
33. Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 301–2.
34. Ibid., 302.
35. Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 219 n. 74.

“Secret Combinations”: A Legal Analysis (Oman) • 55

the nineteenth century, and a large number of the older opinions are
not on computer since they are not of current legal interest.”³⁶
Nevertheless, Peterson located ten legal cases from the nineteenth century that used the phrase secret combination.³⁷ The earliest reported opinion he located was from 1850,³⁸ and all but one of
the cases he cited were from federal courts, half of them being from
the United States Supreme Court.³⁹ Although he does not mention
it, the exclusively federal nature of the materials that Peterson seems
to have examined is potentially signiﬁcant because during the nineteenth century, there was comparatively little federal law. The amount
of federal criminal law was miniscule. Finally, very few criminal cases
made their way to the U.S. Supreme Court.⁴⁰ Indeed, under the Judiciary Act of 1789 in force during the lifetime of Joseph Smith, the U.S.
Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases,⁴¹ an
important point since the term combination was often used to refer to
conspiracy⁴²—one would expect it to appear more often in criminal
matters. In 1990, Welch did not have extensive access to computerized
versions of early nineteenth-century state opinions,⁴³ although at least
partial federal coverage—mainly Supreme Court decisions—would
36. Ibid., 191–92.
37. Ibid., 190–93.
38. The case is Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 57 U.S. 314 (1850); Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 192.
39. Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 190–93.
40. Today the Supreme Court’s docket always includes a contingent of criminal
cases. However, most of these cases involve a federal constitutional challenge to a state
criminal conviction. Prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in the wake of
the Civil War, none of the federal constitution’s rights for criminal defendants applied to
state convictions. Even after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, it wasn’t until
well into the twentieth century that the Supreme Court interpreted it as applying the Bill
of Rights to the states.
41. Richard H. Fallon Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer, and David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s
The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 5th ed. (Westbury, NY: Foundation, 2003), 32.
The Supreme Court could take jurisdiction in criminal cases by issuing a writ of habeas
corpus, although this was extremely rare. Ibid.
42. Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 189.
43. John W. Welch, memorandum to Daniel Peterson, 18 September 1989 (copy in
my possession) (“a lot of the older opinions are not on computer”).
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have extended into the eighteenth century. Thus, the legal universe
that Peterson’s research covered was severely constrained, and his results were understandably inconclusive.
In his book Digging in Cumorah, Mark Thomas also examines
early legal materials as a potential source for alternate uses of “secret combination.”⁴⁴ He concludes that “Peterson’s hypothesis that
‘secret combinations’ is a vague, generalized symbol with no speciﬁc
referent cannot be substantiated by the very legal documents where
he suggests that evidence will be found.”⁴⁵ Unfortunately, Thomas’s
examination of legal sources is too narrow to be of any real value.
Apparently taken with Peterson’s discussion of labor disputes and
the possible connection of the phrase secret combination with early
labor unions, Thomas turned his attention exclusively to six early
nineteenth-century cases dealing with striking workers.⁴⁶ Thomas
claims that Peterson “is certain that an examination of precedentsetting cases of labor unions (‘combinations’) will support his broad
interpretation that excludes Masonry.”⁴⁷ While Peterson does discuss
unions, the late nineteenth-century cases he cites deal with a variety of subjects.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, Thomas’s research is limited to labor
cases. This choice is puzzling. The proto-unionists that Thomas discusses were prosecuted under the common law of conspiracy. The
labor cases simply use the term combination to refer to the agreement
necessary to form the conspiracy. There is nothing special about its
application to labor unions. Once this point is understood, Thomas’s
choice to limit his research to labor disputes makes little sense. What
is more, since labor cases formed only a miniscule fraction of all early
nineteenth-century litigation,⁴⁹ the fact that the phrase secret combi44. Mark D. Thomas, Digging in Cumorah: Reclaiming Book of Mormon Narratives
(Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1999), 209–12.
45. Ibid., 212.
46. Ibid., 210–11.
47. Ibid., 210.
48. See Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 191–93.
49. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1985), 553: “The labor problem . . . was practically speaking of major legal
importance only after the Civil War.”
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nation does not occur in a sample of those cases has limited signiﬁcance since the vast majority of nineteenth-century cases involving
combinations of any kind had nothing to do with labor unions. For
example, I was able to locate only one appellate case from anywhere
in the United States before 1826 involving labor unions and the word
combination,⁵⁰ yet during just the period of the 1820s, the supreme
court of New York alone used the term in over thirty cases.⁵¹
Combinations and Secret Combinations in Early Judicial Opinions
Since Peterson made the ﬁrst foray into legal materials in search of
secret combinations more than a decade ago, the availability of early
judicial opinions in computerized format has dramatically expanded.
It is now possible to search the decisions of many state and federal
courts from the closing decades of the eighteenth and early decades
of the nineteenth centuries. However, there are still reasons to be cautious about the results of such searches. First, coverage remains very
incomplete both because not all early case reporters are available in
computerized format and because coverage of cases in the early reporters themselves is very incomplete.⁵²
Second, the vast majority of the available cases come from appellate courts, which fact distorts any searches in a variety of ways. Appellate decisions make up only a small fraction of all litigation. Judges
decide most cases without any published opinion, and this was more
markedly the case in the early nineteenth century than today. Most
cases are never appealed. Furthermore, the cases in the appellate reports tend to be exceptional. This does not mean that they were the
high-proﬁle cases of the time, although sometimes they were. Rather
50. People v. Melvin, Yates Selected Cases 112 (N.Y.Sup. 1809) (involving an attempted strike by cordwainers).
51. On 19 July 2002 I ran the search “DA(BEF 01/01/1830 & AFT 01/01/1820) &
COMBINATION!” in the NY-CS database on Westlaw, which for this period includes reports from the state supreme court and the chancery court. The search produced thirtyfour opinions. Note that during the early nineteenth century the high court of New York
was called the supreme court, as opposed to the court of appeals, as it is now known.
52. Friedman, History of American Law, 322–25.
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it means that they have a diﬀerent character than most litigation. Generally cases turn on questions of fact. “Did John actually steal Abner’s
cow?” However, appellate cases generally turn on issues of law. “Can
multiple defendants be joined in a single suit at equity?” Although the
categories of law and fact were more ﬂuid in the early nineteenth century, appellate cases from the period still tend to contain involved legal
discussion. This does not mean that the cases were exclusively technical
or that they were devoid of discussion of events. On the contrary, they
often provide fascinating windows into bits of late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century life. However, in evaluating the virtues and the
limitations of searching such materials, it is important to remember
that we are looking at a narrow and, in some ways, unrepresentative
slice of the legal past.
Webster’s 1828 dictionary deﬁnes the word combination as an
Intimate union, or association of two or more persons or
things, by set purpose or agreement, for eﬀecting some object,
by joint operation; in a good sense, when the object is laudable;
in an ill sense, when it is illegal or iniquitous. It is sometimes
equivalent to league, or to conspiracy. We say a combination
of men to overthrow government, or a combination to resist
oppression.⁵³
It is generally acknowledged that combination was a widely used
word in the 1820s. Certainly, a review of judicial opinions from
the period bears this out. For example, a search of pre-1826 legal
opinions reveals that the term combination was used in conjunction
with conspiracy or fraud in more than 150 cases.⁵⁴ Thus the New
53. Quoted in Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’” 189, emphasis in original.
54. On 18 July 2002, a search of the Westlaw ALLCASES-OLD database using the
search term “DA(BEF 01/01/1826) & COMBINATION! /S (FRAUD! CONSPIRI!)” produced 154 opinions. This search would produce all cases in the database from before
1 January 1826 in which any permutation of the word combination appeared in the same
sentence with any permutation of the words fraud or conspiracy. Thus the search included
terms such as conspiracies, conspirator, conspirators, frauds, fraudulent, fraudulently, and
so forth.
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York Supreme Court wrote in 1823 of a “case of a combination or
conspiracy,”⁵⁵ and the high court of Maryland in 1821 referred to a
statute that “declaring . . . to be conspirators, [those] who should be
engaged in certain combinations, subjected them to the law of conspiracy as it then existed.”⁵⁶ The most common formulation seems to
have been fraudulent combination. For example, during the period
from 1820 to 1823 alone, there were twelve cases in the high court of
Joseph Smith’s New York containing that phrase.⁵⁷
The word combination also seems to have had connotations of secrecy. First, as already noted, there is its ubiquitous association with
fraud, which always carries with it such connotations. In addition,
combination was frequently used as though it were synonymous with
secret agreement. For example, the supreme court of Pennsylvania,
writing in 1810, while summarizing the Roman law of fraud for its
common law readers, noted “that fraud, according to the understanding of civilians, consisted in combination and secrecy, beneﬁt to ourselves, and injury to others.”⁵⁸ In another fraud case decided in the
same year, the same court used the term secret contract as a synonym
for combination.⁵⁹ The cases also frequently laid emphasis on the secrecy in which combinations conduct their aﬀairs. Thus, in an 1820
55. McDonald v. Neilson, 2 Cow. 139, 179 (N.Y.Sup. 1823). For direct quotations from
court decisions, the ﬁrst number represents the opening page of the decision, and the
second represents the cited page number. Occasionally, I was unable to determine the
exact pagination from the electronic versions I used.
56. State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 334 (Md. 1821).
57. See McDonald v. Neilson, 2 Cow. 139 (N.Y. 1823); James v. Morey, 2 Cow. 246
(N.Y. 1823); Clark v. Henry, 2 Cow. 324 (N.Y. 1823); Henry v. Davis & Clark, 7 Johns.Ch.
40 (N.Y.Ch. 1823); Bacon v. Bronson, 7 Johns.Ch. 194 (N.Y.Ch. 1823); Hadden v. Spader,
20 Johns. 554 (N.Y. 1822); Slee v. Bloom, 20 Johns. 669 (N.Y. 1822); Neilson v. McDonald,
6 Johns.Ch. 201 (N.Y.Ch. 1822); Star v. Ellis, 6 Johns.Ch. 393 (N.Y.Ch. 1822); Tiernan v.
Wilson, 6 Johns.Ch. 411 (N.Y.Ch. 1822); Slee v. Bloom, 5 Johns.Ch. 366 (N.Y.Ch. 1821);
and Myers v. Bradford, 4 Johns.Ch. 434 (N.Y.Ch. 1820). Note that this list includes cases
from both the highest state law court and the highest state court of equity, which prior to
1848 were separate. In Joseph Smith’s day, law and equity still occupied diﬀerent courts
in the New York system.
58. Cheriot v. Foussat, 3 Binn. 220 (Pa. 1810).
59. Lazarus v. Bryson, 3 Binn. 54, 58 (Pa. 1810).
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salvage case, the court discussed the way in which the law created
incentives to avoid “combination[s] to secrete” shipwrecked valuables
and referred to such combinations as an example of “covert malversation [“corrupt administration”].”⁶⁰ Likewise an early Kentucky case
speaks of the land transfers “secretly made” by a “fraudulent combination.”⁶¹ In 1799, the Maryland Chancery, in a case involving the
various ﬁnancial misdeeds of an insolvent debtor, spoke of the “secret
act” of a “fraudulent combination” directed at his creditors.⁶² Perhaps
the most bizarre case that I located was decided by the Connecticut
Superior Court in 1793. The case involved a slander lawsuit in which
the plaintiﬀ alleged that the defendants falsely accused him of complicity in rape in order to “cover the shame” of the supposed rape victim. In its opinion, the court discusses the alleged “wicked combination” and its relationship to the “secret assault on the body of Marcia
Maples.”⁶³
Broadening the review to include cases from after the outbreak
of anti-Masonic agitation but still within the lifetime of Joseph Smith
reveals the same patterns of use. Four years after the publication of
the Book of Mormon, in one of the ubiquitous cases involving shady
land deals, the supreme court of Virginia discussed a “secret understanding and a combination” between real estate speculators.⁶⁴ A year
earlier a Kentucky court heard a case regarding “the combination . . .
to secrete” debt from creditors.⁶⁵ An opinion written by the Illinois
Supreme Court during the period Joseph Smith resided in the state
speaks of a crooked attorney who, “secretly combining” with another
against his client, formed a “corrupt combination.”⁶⁶ A Missouri case
from 1840, in discussing litigation regarding real estate transactions,
60. Hollingsworth v. Seventy Doubloons & Three Small Pieces of Gold, 12 F.Cas. 380,
381 (D.C.Pa. 1820).
61. Bradley v. Buford, 2 Ky. 12, 12 (Ky.App. 1801).
62. Cheston v. Page’s Executors & Devisees, 4 H. & McH. 466, 480 (Md.Chan. 1799).
63. Monroe v. Maples, 1 Root 553, 553 (Conn.Super. 1793).
64. Spengler v. Snapp, 32 Va. 478, 487 (1834).
65. Bibb v. Smith, 31 Ky. 580, 581 (Ky.App. 1833). The words omitted by the ellipses
are “between Smith and Allen.”
66. Frisby v. Ballance, 5 Ill. 287, 298 (1843).
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mentions a “combination” between speculators and “other persons to
secrete” deeds to land.⁶⁷
These cases suggest three things. First, in the period prior to the
anti-Masonic outcry of the late 1820s, combination was widely used
and had a richer meaning than simply conspiracy or agreement. It
could also carry strong overtones of secrecy, deception, and covertness. Second, combination was not a term speciﬁc to any one branch
of activity. The opinions speak with equal ease about combinations to
take abandoned shipwrecks and combinations to avoid debt. Third,
the anti-Masonic rhetoric of the 1820s does not seem to have had any
eﬀect on the general use of the term. Judging by the judicial materials,
the term has absolutely no association with Masonry either before or
after Morgan’s 1826 disappearance. Nothing indicates that the term
carried any Masonic subtext in later cases. Given this background
meaning, combination was a natural choice for anti-Masons seeking
an epitaph with which to label the objects of their propaganda. However, the same background meaning also provides a plausible explanation of why in translating the Book of Mormon Joseph Smith would
have chosen the word to describe the Gadianton robbers.
Although both Masons and Gadiantons were referred to simply
as a “combination” (see Helaman 2:8; Ether 8:18), the disputed phrase
in the controversy over the anti-Masonic thesis is secret combination.
However, this phrase also appears repeatedly in judicial opinions
from the period. I was able to locate two cases from before 1826 using the precise term. In addition several cases from after the publication of the Book of Mormon use the term in substantially the same
way as the pre-1826 cases. This in turn suggests that, contrary to what
proponents of the anti-Masonic thesis have implied, the anti-Masonic
uproar of the 1820s did not dramatically change the meaning or usage
of the term, although any such claim must be qualiﬁed by the conservative nature of legal language.
The ﬁrst opinion using the term that I located was the case of Duval v. Burtis, decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1819.⁶⁸ The
67. Truesdell v. Callaway, 6 Mo. 605, 612 (1840).
68. Duval v. Burtis, 9 Ky. 120 (Ky.App. 1819).

62 • The FARMS Review 16/1 (2004)

case revolved around a confused set of transactions involving negotiable instruments, cross-boarder attachments of property, lawsuits in
two states, an attempt to assign the rights from one lawsuit to another,
an alleged double- and triple-crossing assistant to a con man, and an
expensive Kentucky horse named Porto. According to the plaintiﬀ,
the defendant had been in league with a shady character from Tennessee who purchased Porto on credit and then left the state. In his
response to the suit, the defendant denied that there was any “secret
combination” between himself and the Tennessean. Although the
case touches on a wide variety of issues in a comparatively short opinion (two pages), one of the issues about which there is not even the
slightest hint is Masonry. Absolutely nothing in the opinion suggests
that the court is using the term secret combination to refer to anything
other than a covert pact to steal a horse.
The second pre-1826 case that I located was much closer to the
publication of the Book of Mormon in both time and space. In July
1825, just fourteen months before Morgan’s disappearance in the same
state, the supreme court of New York issued its opinion in Fellows v.
Fellows.⁶⁹ This opinion is a much grander document than the brief
ruling of the court in Duval v. Burris. Modeled on the early opinions
of the House of Lords, it contains a lengthy summary of the case by
the clerk of the court, excerpts from the speeches oﬀered by counsel
during oral argument, and a string of separate opinions by the court’s
judges. The case involved a bitter family dispute that stretched over
more than a decade. Stripping away the complex ﬁnancial machinations of all parties, the story is simple. A son, in order to sell real estate
encumbered with various obligations, transferred title to his father,
who was to hold the property in trust during the course of the sale,
which was to extend over several years. The father, however, swindled
his son, sold the property, and pocketed the proceeds. The son then
died, and his widow obtained a judgment against the father. The father, in a vain attempt to avoid the judgment, transferred his property
to another son, who was to hold it in trust for him. The widow then
brought a second suit against all her in-laws, arguing that the whole
69. Fellows v. Fellows, 4 Cow. 682 (N.Y.Sup. 1825).
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scheme was a fraud. In the case before the supreme court upholding
her victory in the second lawsuit, the judges and attorneys used various terms to describe the erring members of the Fellows clan. They
were guilty of “combining and confederating.” They constituted a
“fraudulent combination,” an “unlawful combination,” a “combination and confederacy,” and a “secret and fraudulent combination.” Finally, Justice Woodworth referred to them as a “fraudulent and secret
combination.”
The Fellows case is especially instructive for two reasons. First,
it provides a clear and obviously non-Masonic use of the term secret
combination from the immediate vicinity of Joseph Smith that is almost contemporaneous with the outbreak of the anti-Masonic agitation that is supposed to have inspired the Gadianton robbers. Second,
the involved discussion of the various actors in the reported opinion
and their frequent use of diﬀering phrases to describe the same criminal activity provide a marvelous study of how the phrase secret combination was understood in relation to other terms. What Fellows shows
is that secret combination, far from being a bit of jargon newly coined
for the exclusive use of anti-Masons in the late 1820s, ﬁts comfortably
into a set of very common terms that had been used for decades to
describe all kinds of criminal activities.
Furthermore, if we compare these cases with others using the
term secret combination in the two decades after the publication of
the Book of Mormon, we ﬁnd that the use and meaning of the term
seems untouched by anti-Masonry and carries no new overtones.
In 1833, members of the Tennessee Supreme Court considered a
case in which they expressed concern about adopting a rule that
would expose sureties to the risk of ruin at the hands of “secret
combinations.”⁷⁰ Seven years later, a Kentucky court, in discussing
“robbers, thieves, etc.,” suggested that those using common carriers were exposed to a special risk from such “secret combinations.”⁷¹
70. Wells v. Grant, 12 Tenn. 491, 494 (1833). Although the identity of the secret combinations is not clear, from context the court seems to have in mind combinations between debtors and creditors against sureties.
71. Frankfort Bridge Company v. Williams, 39 Ky. 403, 405 (1840).
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Interestingly, this case used the term speciﬁcally to refer to conspiracies between legitimate businesses and outlaws on the highway, which is suggestive, given the Book of Mormon’s repeated references to the Gadiantons as robbers (see Helaman 6:18; 3 Nephi
1:27; 4 Nephi 1:17) and their sometime association with respectable
elites (see Helaman 1–2).⁷² An 1843 case from South Carolina uses
the phrase in a diﬀerent context. After the Bank of South Carolina
suspended specie payments three times during the ﬁnancial panics
of the 1830s, the state attorney general claimed that the bank had
violated its charter and should be dissolved. A circuit court that
ruled in the bank’s favor discussed the various legitimate reasons a
bank might suspend specie payments. Among them it listed “secret
combinations” of predatory foreign corporations.⁷³ These cases
suggest that contrary to the position occasionally adopted by Quinn
and Vogel,⁷⁴ one need not assume that every post-1826 reference to
secret combinations carries an anti-Masonic subtext or has an antiMasonic rhetorical pedigree. Rather, the legal materials suggest
that the phrase carried a fairly constant meaning both before and
after the outbreak of anti-Masonic agitation.
On Legalese
Vogel has questioned the usefulness of examining legal documents at all for understanding the language of the Book of Mormon.
“Legalese,” he declares, “was not the language of Joseph Smith, nor
72. Indeed, John W. Welch has argued that the Book of Mormon’s choice of the word
robbers to designate the Gadiantons draws on an ancient legal distinction between outlaw bands and mere thieves. See his “Theft and Robbery in the Book of Mormon and in
Near Eastern Law” (FARMS paper, 1989). See also Thomas, Digging in Cumorah, 196,
who argues that Gadianton robbers were identiﬁed with social elites.
73. The circuit court’s opinion is included in the introductory notes to the intermediate
court of appeals of South Carolina’s opinion in State v. The Bank of South Carolina, 1 Speers
433 (S.C.Err. 1843). Because there was doubtless some time between the decision of the circuit court and the court of errors, the date of the circuit court may be earlier—for example,
1842; however, it is undated.
74. Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World View, 511–12 n. 216; Vogel, “Echoes
of Anti-Masonry,” 302.
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was it the language of his intended audience.”⁷⁵ There is some merit
to this criticism. Certainly, lawyers have a well-deserved reputation
for tortured prose, and as I indicated earlier, appellate cases such
as those I have examined are more likely to be technical. Likewise,
while Joseph Smith studied law later when he was serving as a judge
in Nauvoo⁷⁶ and some of his revelations from that period use legal
terms (see D&C 132:7),⁷⁷ there is no evidence that he had any extensive familiarity with legal materials in the Palmyra period.⁷⁸ Nor is
there any reason to suppose that the Book of Mormon is (generally
speaking) written in technical legal language.⁷⁹
75. Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 301.
76. See Scott H. Faulring, ed., An American Prophet’s Record: The Diaries and Journals of Joseph Smith (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1989), 321. See also Dallin H. Oaks,
“The Suppression of the Nauvoo Expositor,” Utah Law Review 9 (1964–1965): 862, 875
(which discusses Joseph Smith’s exposure to Blackstone’s Commentaries in Nauvoo City
Council meetings). By the Nauvoo period, Joseph was deeply involved in quite complex
civil litigation, and it is unlikely that he would have escaped familiarity with at least some
technical legal terms. See Dallin H. Oaks and Joseph I. Bentley, “Joseph Smith and Legal
Process: In the Wake of the Steamboat Nauvoo,” Brigham Young University Law Review
1976/3 (1976): 735 (which discusses in depth Joseph Smith’s civil litigation in Nauvoo).
77. Truman Madsen has noted: “Some of the verses [from section 132] describe the
conditions of the everlasting covenant in such terms as an attorney might use who had
spent days thinking up every possible synonym, nuance, and contingency so that no
loophole would remain.” Truman G. Madsen, Joseph Smith the Prophet (Salt Lake City:
Bookcraft, 1989), 22–23.
78. However, it is worth noting in this regard that Joseph had had experience with
the law by 1826. In that year he was charged with being a “ ‘disorderly person’ ” in connection with money-digging activities in Pennsylvania. See Gordon A. Madsen, “Joseph
Smith’s 1826 Trial: The Legal Setting,” BYU Studies 30/2 (1990): 91.
79. John Welch, however, has noted the existence of legal materials and legal concepts
in the Book of Mormon, although he identiﬁes elements of ancient Hebrew law, rather than
early American jurisprudence. See John W. Welch, “Law and War in the Book of Mormon,”
in Warfare in the Book of Mormon, ed. Stephen D. Ricks and William J. Hamblin (Salt
Lake City: Deseret Book and FARMS, 1990), 46–102; John W. Welch, “Lehi’s Last Will
and Testament: A Legal Approach,” in The Book of Mormon: Second Nephi, The Doctrinal
Structure, ed. Monte S. Nyman and Charles D. Tate Jr. (Provo, UT: BYU Religious Studies
Center, 1989), 61–82; John W. Welch, “Legal Perspectives on the Slaying of Laban,” Journal
of Book of Mormon Studies 1 (1992): 119–41; John W. Welch, “Law in the Book of Mormon:
The Nephite Court Cases” (FARMS paper, 1996); John W. Welch, “ ‘If a Man . . .’: The Casuistic Law Form in the Book of Mormon” (FARMS paper, 1987); John W. Welch, “Series of
Laws in the Book of Mormon” (FARMS paper, 1987); John W. Welch, “Judicial Process in
the Trial of Abinadi” (FARMS paper, 1981).
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However, it would be unwise to overstate the force of this argument. Despite its reputation among lay people, legal language is
not an impenetrable mass of exclusively technical jargon. Certainly,
legal writing can be turgid, but much of it uses words in their ordinary senses. To evaluate the strength of the “legalese” criticism, it
is important to understand something about legal language. While
we should be cautious in generalizing about ordinary language on
the basis of legal materials, it is simplistic to assume that all judicial
opinions can be dismissed as irrelevant “legalese.” Rather, attention
to the way speciﬁc words are used and an appreciation for what is—
and is not—technical about legal language is needed.
Obviously, legal language contains many technical terms. These
fall into essentially three diﬀerent categories. First, there are those
words that are speciﬁc to the law itself. In Joseph Smith’s day most
of these terms were drawn from the common law of England, which
was inherited by Americans at the time of the Revolution. The exclusively technical terms of this body of law, in turn, date back to
the late medieval period and consist of a pastiche of Latin words and
what is known as “law French.” Law French was a strange linguistic
descendant of the medieval French spoken by the eleventh-century
Norman conquerors of England. A mongrel language that reminded
one modern legal scholar of “the taunting Frenchman from Monty
Python and the Holy Grail,”⁸⁰ law French was the oﬃcial spoken language of the English courts from about 1250 until about 1500, and
it continued to be the language of written reports for about another
80. David Franklin, “Pardon My Law French,” Greenbag (Summer 1999): 421. This
article contains the following example of seventeenth-century law French, which gives
one some sense of its bizarre quality: “Richardson Chief Justice de Common Banc al assises de Salisbury in Summer 1631 fuit assault per prisoner la condemne pur felony, que
puis son condemnation ject un brickbat a le dit justice, que narrowly mist, et pur ceo immediately fuit indictment drawn per Noy envers le prisoner et son dexter manus ampute
et ﬁx al gibbet, sur que luy mesme immediatement hange in presence de Court.” Ibid.
This kind of tortured language led one distraught French diplomat to write in the time of
Elizabeth I that law French “may be worthily compared to some old ruines of some faire
building, where so many brambles and thorns are grown, that scarecely it appeareth that
ever there had bin any house.” Ibid.
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century thereafter.⁸¹ From it are drawn terms such as replevin,⁸² trover,⁸³ larceny,⁸⁴ and trespass.⁸⁵ Other technical terms such as habeas
corpus,⁸⁶ assumpsit,⁸⁷ and nisi prius⁸⁸ are either Latin or have Latin
roots. All of these terms are purely technical and have no English
meaning outside of the common law. In the case of some of the
words drawn from law French, they have no nonlegal meaning at
all, having never been natural words in any tongue other than the
unique language of the medieval English courts.
The second class of technical terms includes those words that have
meanings in ordinary English but have substantially diﬀerent meanings in the law. A classic example of this kind of term is the word malice. In ordinary speech malice has the connotation of malevolence and
81. Franklin, “Pardon My Law French,” 421.
82. “An action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or
chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully . . . taken
[them].” Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West, 1990), 1299. For an example, see Henderson v. Ballantine, 4 Cow. 549 (N.Y.Sup. 1825) (a New York case from
Joseph Smith’s period that uses the term replevin).
83. “In common-law practice, the action of trover . . . is a species of action on the case,
and originally lay for the recovery of damages against a person who had found another’s
goods and wrongfully converted them to his own use.” Black’s, 1508. For an example, see
Ex Parte Ward, 5 Cow. 20 (N.Y.Sup. 1825) (a New York case from Joseph Smith’s period
that uses the term trover).
84. “Felonious stealing, taking and carrying, leading, riding, or driving away another’s
personal property, with intent to convert it or to deprive [the] owner thereof.” Black’s, 881.
For an example of such technical language, see Mills v. McCoy, 4 Cow. 406 (N.Y.Sup. 1825)
(a New York case from Joseph Smith’s period that uses the term larceny).
85. “An unlawful interference with one’s person, property, or rights.” Black’s, 1502.
For an example, see Hodges v. Chace, 2 Wend. 248 (N.Y.Sup. 1829) (a New York case from
Joseph Smith’s period that uses the term trespass).
86. “The name given to a variety of writs . . . having for their object to bring a party
before a court or judge.” Black’s, 709. For an example, see Ex parte Tayloe, 5 Cow. 39
(N.Y.Sup. 1825) (a New York case from Joseph Smith’s period that uses the term habeas
corpus).
87. “A promise or engagement by which one person assumes or undertakes to do
some act or pay something to another.” Black’s, 122. For an example, see Gourley v. Allen,
5 Cow. 644 (N.Y.Sup. 1825) (a New York case from Joseph Smith’s day that uses the term
assumpsit).
88. “The nisi prius courts are such as are held for the trial of issues of fact before a jury
and one presiding judge.” Black’s, 1047. For an example, see Flower v. Allen, 5 Cow. 654
(N.Y.Sup. 1825) (a New York case from Joseph Smith’s period using the term nisi prius).
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conscious ill will. In the common law, however, malice is an element
of the crime of murder—famously deﬁned as “the unlawful killing of
any reasonable creature in being with malice aforethought”⁸⁹—and
has a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent meaning. Malice speciﬁcally refers to the
state of mind necessary for a homicide to become a murder. Generally,
this has been understood at a minimum as knowledge that the actions
one is engaged in will result in the death of another. What has been
universally agreed is that subjective ill will is not a necessary component of the legal concept of malice. Thus, the loving child who poisons
her dying mother in order to ease her suﬀering from a terminal illness
has acted with “malice” under the law, regardless of her subjective altruism. However, the man who, in a ﬁt of rage, insults his worst enemy
who then, as a result of a rare disease, dies of a heart attack has not
acted with “malice,” despite his hatred and ill will.
Third, there are those terms that have substantially the same
meaning in ordinary English and in the law but which the law deﬁnes
with greater precision. For example, in ordinary speech the word assault means “to attack.” In the law, it has essentially the same meaning
but is reﬁned with greater precision. An assault is an action by one
person that causes another person to have a reasonable fear of serious
bodily injury. Thus a man who takes a swing at his wife’s face with a
baseball bat has assaulted her in both the ordinary and legal sense of
the word. On the other hand, a toddler who kicks an NFL linebacker
has not committed an assault because while he attacks the linebacker,
any fear of serious bodily injury that the linebacker might have is not
reasonable. Likewise, a man who brandishes a machete threateningly
over his victim’s head has not assaulted him if the victim is looking
the other way. This is because the victim’s ignorance of the machete
means that it cannot cause him to have any fear of bodily injury at
all. Such examples of precise deﬁnitions that substantially track ordinary speech but that occasionally produce anomalous results could be
multiplied endlessly. For example, the technical deﬁnition of murder
given in the preceding paragraph falls into this category.
89. The deﬁnition is attributed to the great seventeenth-century chief justice Sir Edward Coke.
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Armed with this more nuanced understanding of the technicality of legal language, it is possible to better appreciate the usefulness
of early judicial opinions for evaluating the anti-Masonic thesis. The
phrases combination and secret combination do not seem to fall into
any of these classes of technical “legalese.” Combination was not a
speciﬁcally legal term of art such as words drawn from Latin or law
French. Nor does it seem to have had a technical meaning in either of
the two ways explained above.
Perhaps signiﬁcantly, none of the cases that I reviewed involved
jury instructions regarding the meaning of the word combination,
which further strengthens the claim that the word was not being used
in a technical sense. In instructing juries, judges often provide explanations of technical legal terms. I qualify the signiﬁcance of this absence for two reasons. First, the coverage of published opinions during this era is incomplete.⁹⁰ Second, prior to the American Revolution,
juries enjoyed a great deal of autonomy and were relatively free from
strict judicial oversight.⁹¹ In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, however, this changed as judges began to “rein in” juries
with, among other things, more technical instructions.⁹² Juries in the
1820s still enjoyed a greater amount of autonomy than do modern juries. Thus even though judges were seeking to more tightly control juries, we should expect fewer cases involving jury instructions than we
see today. Nevertheless, New York opinions from before 1826 included
discussion of jury instructions related to trespass on the case,⁹³ larceny,⁹⁴ and the distinction between theft and ordinary trespass.⁹⁵ It is
thus not unreasonable to expect that there would be jury instructions
deﬁning combination if it were in fact a technical term. The absence of
90. Friedman, History of American Law, 322–25.
91. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 28.
92. Ibid., 141–43.
93. See Merritt v. Brinkerhoﬀ, 17 Johns. 306 (N.Y.Sup. 1820) (which discusses the
rights and duties of a mill owner vis-à-vis downstream users of the millstream).
94. People v. Anderson, 14 Johns. 294 (N.Y.Sup. 1817) (which discusses what must be
found by the jury in order to hold the accused guilty).
95. Dexter v. Taber, 12 Johns. 239 (N.Y.Sup. 1815) (which discusses the distinction
between theft and trespass in the context of an allegedly slanderous accusation).
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such instructions is suggestive. All of this points to the conclusion that,
contrary to what some have suggested,⁹⁶ combination and secret combination were not technical legal terms in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth
century. They were used in legal opinions, but they were not “legalese.”
Rather they were similar to terms such as trade,⁹⁷ business, or livelihood⁹⁸ that appeared in legal opinions without taking on any special
legal meaning. Far from being “irrelevant” for understanding normal
language, such nontechnical legal materials can provide us with valid
samples of how common words and phrases were understood.
Limitations, Implications, and Conclusions
Legal materials suggest that contrary to the claims of proponents of the anti-Masonic thesis, the term secret combination did not
have an exclusively anti-Masonic meaning. Rather it seems to have
been used as a general term to refer to hidden criminal agreements
and conspiracies. It was used this way prior to the disappearance of
Captain Morgan and continued to be used in the same way after the
outbreak of anti-Masonic agitation. The continuity of meaning in
the legal opinions suggests that those who see in every post-1826 use
of the term an anti-Masonic subtext are probably overplaying the
linguistic inﬂuence of anti-Masonry. Rather, in the absence of speciﬁc evidence linking a use of the term to anti-Masonry, the best way
of reading post-1826 uses of secret combination is probably to simply look at their contexts and take the plain meaning at face value.
Admittedly, there are more post-1826 occurrences of the term than
pre-1826 occurrences in the legal materials. It might be tempting
to attribute this increase to the inﬂuence of anti-Masonic rhetoric.
However, it is probably a mistake to do so. A more likely explanation
96. For example, Vogel argues, “It is irrelevant what the phrase ‘secret combinations’
meant in technical language at the time, even if it did have a separate legal deﬁnition.”
Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 301.
97. See, for example, Smith v. Lusher, 5 Cow. 688 (N.Y.Sup. 1825) (referring to “partners in trade”).
98. See, for example, Seymour v. Ellison, 2 Cow. 13 (N.Y.Sup. 1823): “His business was
. . . very limited; aﬀording him but a scanty livelihood.”
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is simply that there were more judicial opinions as the century progressed. As the American population and the American economy
grew during the ﬁrst half of the century, the amount of litigation
increased accordingly. In addition, as the century progressed, the
publication of judicial opinions became more regular and comprehensive. The inﬂuence of anti-Masonry as an explanation is simply
dwarfed in comparison to the explosion in the volume of published
opinions during the nineteenth century.⁹⁹
Still, it is important to understand the limitations of legal materials. Judicial opinions tell us something about the way in which
language was understood at diﬀerent periods of time. However, the
meaning of the phrase secret combination is only one part—and not
the most important part—of the debate over the anti-Masonic thesis.
Obviously, analysis of legal materials is not the same thing as analysis
of the Book of Mormon, and an interpretation of the phrase secret combination is not the same thing as an interpretation of the Gadianton
robbers. These are important issues, but they are clearly beyond the
scope of this paper. Likewise, legal materials can be technical. Their
use will require a nuanced sense of when it is—and is not—possible to
generalize based on legal writings.
It is also important to understand how narrow the scope of materials covered by even my comparatively comprehensive search is. The
reported decisions of the appellate courts from the early nineteenth
century form a very small part of the legal universe. Legal language, in
turn, forms only a narrow part of all language. The narrowness of my
research cuts both ways. Proponents of the anti-Masonic thesis can
point out that a review of such materials does not constitute extensive
reading in the primary pre-1830 sources.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, the
repeated appearance of the phrase secret combinations in such a narrow slice of language also suggests that its use may have been much
more widespread.
99. See, for example, Friedman, History of American Law, 409 (which discusses the
rise of the West’s reporter system).
100. Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 301.
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Finally, it is important to understand the way in which previous
discussions of legal materials in the context of the anti-Masonic thesis
have been mistaken. Neither combination nor secret combination were
technical legal terms. Their use was not conﬁned to any one area of the
law. It is thus a mistake to expect to ﬁnd them especially concentrated
in one kind of litigation. It is also a mistake to assume that their use
in judicial opinions would have been unintelligible or foreign to lay
people. Nor should we expect to ﬁnd some alternate exclusive use of
the term. Thus, while the anti-Masonic thesis posits that secret combination was a term with an exclusively (or nearly exclusively) antiMasonic meaning, in using legal materials to criticize the thesis, it is a
mistake to go looking for an alternative exclusive meaning, whether it
be describing labor unions or guerrilla ﬁghters.
Ultimately, I think that the issue of the term secret combination
and the anti-Masonic thesis comes down to a choice between two
options. First is the claim that secret combination carried such an
exclusively anti-Masonic meaning that its use in the Book of Mormon,
especially with regard to latter-day prophecies, was a direct and intentional reference to Masonry.¹⁰¹ This position depends on the exclusivity and uniqueness of the anti-Masonic use of the term. The second
position is that the term had a broader meaning and cannot be read as
a simple reference to Masonry. This position does not involve a denial
that anti-Masonry may have changed the connotation of the term in
some contexts or that anti-Masonic uses of the phrase are useful in
understanding the original language of the Book of Mormon translation. However, it does involve the claim that secret combination had a
broader meaning than that attributed to it by proponents of the antiMasonic thesis. I believe that the legal materials discussed in this paper
101. Interestingly, Vogel’s earlier treatment of anti-Masonic readings of the Book of
Mormon is considerably more tentative and less strident than his later response to critics. In 1989, he wrote, “Right or wrong, it’s certain that Martin Harris and other early
readers held anti-Masonic interpretations of the Book of Mormon’s contents. How deep
these went is not entirely clear.” Vogel, “Mormonism’s ‘Anti-Masonick Bible,’ ” 28. In
2002, although he oﬀers substantially the same evidence, Vogel wrote more certainly that
“Joseph Smith was aware of the Masonic connotation, and his use of the phrase [secret
combinations] was clearly intentional.” Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 300.
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severely undermine the ﬁrst position and suggest that the phrase secret
combination cannot be read as a simple reference to Masonry. On the
contrary, judicial opinions from the early nineteenth century provide
numerous, concrete examples of non-Masonic uses of the term.

